Perception and Knowledge
(currently Revise and Resubmit at Episteme)
Abstract: This paper develops a form of disjunctivism grounded in a presentational view of experience, on which the epistemic benefits of experience consist in the way perception presents the subject with aspects of her environment.
(currently Revise and Resubmit at Grazer Philosophische Studien)
Abstract: This paper defends transparent self-knowledge of perceptual reasons against Williamson’s famous “anti-luminosity” argument. Williamson’s argument depends on a quasi-empirical conception of self-knowledge, which we should reject for perceptual rationality.
(currently under review at Pacific Philosophical Quarterly)
Abstract: Perceptual reasons are consistent with the “knowledge-first” type of epistemological disjunctivism proposed by Clayton Littlejohn and Alan Millar. Indeed, I argue that reasons are central to disjunctivism’s anti-skeptical strategy.
Perception and The Unity of Consciousness
(currently under review at Southern Philosophical Studies)
Abstract: I provide a Kant-derived explanation of the unity of conscious experience grounded in the experience’s representational content. Central is the way our cognitive faculty is operative both in judgment and experience, providing experience’s representational content.
Abstract: I argue that Charles Travis’s powerful anti-representationalist argument is undermined by Travis’s assumption that perceptual representations must be “recognized” from perceptual phenomenology. In rational creatures, I argue that perceptual representations are known “lucidly”, that is, by reflection alone.
Kant and Leibniz
(currently under review at Journal of the History of Philosophy)
Abstract: In Kant’s vocabulary, an “Achilles” argument is an inference from a “unity” in the mind or soul to the conclusion that the mind or soul is a substance. Kant is taken to reject the “Achilles” in the Paralogisms, but I argue the arguments in this section are directed at more specific views held by rational psychologists like Mendelssohn and Baumgarten.
Abstract: I argue Kant’s description of sensation (Empfindung) as the “material” of cognition should be read specifically in light of a hylomorphic conception of cognition found in Leibniz. The major upshot is that “matter” is merely passive, and cannot be seen as independent of its “active” form, i.e. the spontaneity of the intellect.